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Arbitration Nation: While Arbitration
Grows, Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards May Be Shrinking
Sands v. Menard, Inc.;
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, arbitration has been embraced with almost "religious fervor"
by federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court.2 Whether this support is
due to confidence in the arbitration model or a desire to reduce the federal docket,
it is undeniable that arbitration has become a favored tool, especially in the em-
ployment law context.3 In order to serve the main purposes of arbitration and
provide a "quick, efficient, and final means of resolving disputes," judicial review
of arbitration, in both state and federal courts, remains quite limited.4 Even mis-
takes of fact or law are generally not subject to re-examination.
In Sands v. Menard, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin upheld an arbi-
tration award reinstating a discharged attorney to her position as in-house coun-
sel. 6 On appeal, the court refused to vacate the reinstatement order, notwithstand-
ing the fact that reinstatement was not requested or desired by either party, the
effect of reinstatement was likely to violate the ethical rules that bind attorneys,
and other remedies were available to compensate the aggrieved party.7
This note explores the limited but important role that judicial review plays, and
will continue to play, in arbitration and how this role affected the outcome of
Sands v. Menard.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Sands v. Menard, Inc., Dawn Sands (Sands) was terminated from her posi-
tion as vice president and executive general counsel for Menard, Inc. (Menard)
following a dispute regarding her compensation.8 Sands believed Menard was
paying her less than similarly situated male employees, thus engaging in gender-
based pay discrimination. 9 Pursuant to a binding arbitration clause in the em-
1. 767 N.W.2d 332 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
2. Alfred G. Feliu, Contracts of Employment: The Scope of the FAA's Exclusion, in HANDBOOK ON
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION & ADR 233, 233 (Thomas E. Carborneau & Philip J. McConnaughay
eds., 2007).
3. Id.
4. Charles H. Smith, The Public Policy Exception to the General Rule of Limited Judicial Review of
an Arbitration Award, 19 MIDWEsT L. REV. 177, 177 (2004) (quoting Porter v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co.,
51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
5. Id.
6. Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 334-36.
7. Id. at 333, 336.
8. Id. at 333.
9. Id.
1
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ployment contract, the dispute was submitted to a three-person arbitration panel.' 0
The panel determined that in paying Sands less than male co-workers in similar
positions, Menard violated the Equal Pay Act (EPA)." In addition, Menard reta-
liated against Sands for asserting her rights, violating the EPA,12 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, 14 so the
panel found.' 5
Following these determinations, the panel awarded Sands compensatory and
punitive damages.' 6 Despite the fact that neither party requested it, the panel also
ordered Menard to reinstate Sands to her position as vice president and general
counsel of Menard, with a specified salary and bonus.' 7 The arbitrators reasoned
that not to reinstate Sands would in some ways "reward the company for its mi-
streatment of her."' 8  The panel also noted that both the EPA 9 and Title VII2
specifically provide for reinstatement as an available remedy for violation of those
acts.21 The panel stated that deciding whether to award reinstatement was diffi-
cult.22 It recognized that hostility existed between the parties and that, due to the
company's conduct toward her, Sands felt reinstatement was an inappropriate
remedy. 23 However, citing Hybert v. Hearst,24 a case involving a violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the panel concluded that reins-
tatement, as the favored remedy under the law, was appropriate. 25
Menard refused to comply with the arbitration anel's decision and moved to
vacate the reinstatement order in the circuit court.2  Menard argued that the arbi-
tration panel manifestly disregarded the law by awarding reinstatement in lieu of
front pay.27 Applying the deferential standard customarily employed for review of
10. Id.
11. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006) ("No employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work....").
12. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (It shall be unlawful for any person "to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or insti-
tuted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.").
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter .... ).
14. WIs. STAT. ANN. § IIl .36(1)(d)(2) (West current through 2009) (It is unlawful for any employer
to "discharge or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any discri-
minatory practices .... .").
15. Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 333.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 333-34.
18. Id. at 334.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2006).
21. Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 333.
22. Id. at 334.
23. Id. at 333-34.
24. 900 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir. 1990).
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arbitration awards,28 the circuit court refused to vacate the reinstatement order and
concluded that any error would only be error of fact or law, neither of which is
sufficient to vacate an arbitration award.29
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed the lower
court's decision, following precedent and the general practice of giving deference
to arbitration awards. 30 The court of appeals determined that its role was "super-
visory in nature" and stated, as the circuit court had, that courts do not overturn an
arbitrator's decision for mere errors of fact or law.31 The court then laid out the
circumstances under which a Wisconsin court may overturn an arbitration award
and ultimately held that the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded the law and
32that there existed no basis for vacating the arbitration award.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Arbitration Generally-Broad Discretion and Limited Judicial Review
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),33 enacted in 1925, was enacted to combat
the then-existing judicial hostility towards compelling arbitration, even when a
contract between parties called for it. Quite ironically, considering courts' histori-
cal reluctance to compel arbitration, once arbitration has produced a decision,
courts have given extreme deference to those decisions and generally conduct
modest, sometimes perfunctory review of arbitral awards. 34 As a result, a nearly
irrebuttable Presumption exists that arbitral awards, once rendered, are legally
enforceable. One of the purposes of the limitation on review is that arbitration is
,36
meant to offer "a quick, efficient, and final means of resolving disputes." As a
result, arbitration is seen as a good alternative to an already crowded court system.
Thomas Carbonneau, a noted scholar on arbitration, contends, "[T]he [Supreme]
Court has made arbitration agreements nothing less than the means for remedying
a dysfunctionality of judicial adjudication in American society."37
Even before the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925,
courts were open to enforcing arbitration awards. As early as 1854, the Supreme
Court determined that the grounds for challenging an arbitration award should be
28. H. David Kelley, Jr., Practical Concerns Affecting the Arbitration of Statutory Claims, in
HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION & ADR, supra note 2, at 341, 350-51 (noting that judicial
review of arbitration awards is very limited, and that generally, awards are not overturned for errors of
law or fact but only when there is "manifest disregard of the law" or a statutory basis for vacatur).
29. Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 334.
30. Id. at 334-36.
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id. at 335.
33. 9 U.S.C §§ 1-16 (2006).
34. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 125 (World Arbitration
and Mediation Review ed., 2d ed. 2007) (2004).
35. Id.
36. Smith, supra, note 4, at 177 (citing Porter v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 341
(Cal C1. App. 1996)).
37. CARBONNEAU, supra note 34, at xvi.
38. Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICr RESOL. 509, 516 (2009).
No. I] Arbitration Nation 207
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severely limited.39 One legal source contends, "A review of the case law . . . re-
veals that whatever the ground or excuse offered for avoiding an arbitration
award, the results are usually the same-the award stands as originally issued."4
This is generally true of arbitration awards today.
In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,41 the Supreme Court was
asked to determine "whether statutory grounds for prompt vacatur and modifica-
tion of arbitration awards could be supplemented by contract." 42 The dispute in
Hall Street occurred following a disagreement between a lessor and lessee of
commercial real estate.4 3 The matter between the parties concerned indemnifica-
tion for the clean-up of leased property and the lessee's ability to vacate the prop-
erty." The parties ultimately decided to arbitrate the indemnity portion of their
claim. 45 In the resulting arbitration agreement, the parties included a provision
expanding the scope of judicial review for errors of law made by the arbitrator.46
The SuEreme Court, deciding the case under the FAA, held this expansion
invalid. The Court stated that statutory grounds provided by the FAA were ex-
clusive and could not be expanded by contract.48 The Court noted that Congress
"enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a "national
policy favoring [it]."' 49 In addition, the FAA was to place arbitration agreements
on equal footing with all other contracts.5 0  Citing section 9 of the FAA,5 ' the
Court noted that "a court 'must' confirm an arbitration award 'unless' it is va-
cated, modified, or corrected 'as prescribed' in sections 10 and 11."52 The Court
went on to hold that sections 10 and 11 provided the exclusive grounds for expe-
dited judicial vacatur and modification of arbitration decisions.
Hall Street effectively narrowed the number of situations in which an arbitra-
tor's decision may be overturned or modified and precluded parties from contract-
ing for expanded judicial review. Although the Court limited its holding to cases
brought under the FAA, its decision indicates movement in the law toward con-
tracting judicial review of arbitration awards. This change is likely to affect the
39. Id.; Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) ("If an award is within the submission, and
contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of
equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact.").
40. PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION
LAW § 20:118 (2010).
41. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
42. Id. at 578.




47. Id. at 584.
48. Id. at 585-86.
49. Id. at 581 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 500 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
50. Id.
51. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11 (2006). Section 10(a)(4) provides:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was
made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration .
. . (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
52. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 587.
53. Id. at 584.
208 [Vol. 2010
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entire judicial landscape, both federal and state. Federal arbitration law influences
all arbitration law and the Supreme Court seems to have used the FAA to elabo-
rate a larger judicial doctrine on arbitration.54 To illustrate just how influential the
FAA is, consider that the FAA is binding in diversity cases in which state law
applies and upon state courts in state law cases that may be linked in some way to
interstate commerce.55 In addition, the FAA preempts state laws that contradict its
content. In reality, the FAA is the national law of arbitration.
B. Wisconsin Law
In Madison Teacher's Inc. v. Madison Metropolitan School District,57 Madi-
son Teachers, Inc. (MTI) filed a grievance on behalf of three teachers regarding a
,,58problem with "overload and planning time. Discussions between MTI and the
Madison Metropolitan School District (District) produced an agreement to estab-
lish a joint committee to tackle the problem. 59 Additionally, a memorandum em-
bodying the agreement was created.6o The District regarded the above decisions
as a resolution of MTI's grievance.6 ' However, MTI did not consider the initial
62grievances resolved. Pursuant to a binding agreement, the issue of whether the
dispute had been resolved was submitted for arbitration. 63 Agreeing with the Dis-
trict, the arbitrator determined that the creation of the committee and the written
memorandum served as a settlement between the parties and that the arbitrator
was without jurisdiction to address the issue further.M MTI appealed in the circuit
court and the court ordered vacatur of the arbitration order.65 The District then
appealed the vacatur to the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
The Court of A~ppeals of Wisconsin made clear the scope of review of an ar-
bitrator's decision.6 The court stated, "We presume the arbitrator's decision is
valid, and we disturb it only where invalidity is shown by clear and convincing
evidence." 67 The court went on to explain that "[c]ourts may not overturn an arbi-
trator's decision for mere errors of fact or law." 68 The court stated that courts may
overturn an arbitrator's decision only when there is "perverse misconstruction,"
"positive misconduct, . . . manifest disregard of the law, or if the award itself is
illegal or violates strong public policy."69 The court rationalized that, in agreeing
54. CARBONNEAU, supra note 34, at xv, 80.
55. Id. at 80.
56. Id.
57. 678 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
58. Id. at 313.




63. Id. at 314-15.




68. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
69. Id.; see also Baldwin-Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent. Educ. Ass'n-Baldwin Woodville
Unit, 766 N.W.2d 591, 596 (Wis. 2009) (Noting that courts are to vacate an arbitration award where
"arbitrators exceeded their powers [by] 'perverse misconstruction,' positive misconduct, a manifest
209No. I ]
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to arbitrate, the parties "agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's judgment, whether
correct or incorrect as a matter of fact or law." 70 This justified the broad discre-
tion given to arbitrator's decisions.
According to Wisconsin statutory law, there are some situations where vacatur
of an arbitration award must be made.7 1 The relevant part of the statute states that
courts must make an order vacating an arbitration award when "the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."72 This, however,
addresses a different situation than the one presented in Madison, where the court
was not required to vacate the award.
Hybert v. Hearst Corp.,3 is a case that deals with the issue of whether to
award front pay in lieu of reinstatement. 74 In Hybert, the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion against his former employer, Hearst Corporation, for wrongful discharge in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.75  The plaintiff was
awarded front pay but appealed the amount of the award. In its discussion, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hybert, citing McNeil v. Economic
Laboratory, Inc.,77 stated that reinstatement is usually the preferred remedy in
78such a situation. In addition, the court, quoting McNeil, stated, "In determining
whether to award front pay, the court should consider all of the circumstances of
the case.... [A] plaintiff need not request reinstatement as a prerequisite to reco-
vering front pay when reinstatement would be inappropriate."7 In addition, the
court in Hybert quoted the following from McNeil: "reinstatement is not always
appropriate. For example, . . . the employer-employee relationship may be per-
vaded by hostility. When reinstatement is infeasible or inappropriate, front pay
may be appropriate to make the plaintiff whole."80 This statement suggests that
there are some situations where reinstatement is not the preferred remedy and is in
fact wholly inappropriate.
C. Ethical Considerations: Non-attorney Employees v. In-house
Attorney Employees
An understanding of the differing roles of in-house attorney-employees and
non-attorney employees is necessary to appreciate the implications of the Sands
decision. This illumination can be found by exploring the Rules of Professional
Conduct that bind attorneys, in conjunction with a line of cases dealing with
disregard of the law, or when the award is illegal or in violation of strong public policy"); Racine
County v. Int'l Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers (Wis. 2008).
70. Madison Teachers, Inc., 678 N.W.2d at 315.
71. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.10(1)(a)-(d) (West, current through 2009).
72. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 788.10(1)(d).
73. 900 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1990). This case was also cited by the arbitration panel. Sands v. Me-
nard, Inc., 767 N.W.2d 332, 334 (2009).
74. Hybert, 900 F.2d at 1051.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1054-55.
77. 800 F.2d Ill, 118 (7th Cir. 1986).
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"whistle-blowing" attorneys and the public policy concerns regarding any wrong-
ful termination cases they may bring.
Attorneys are bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct ' and, thus, are
constrained in ways that other employees are not. The Wisconsin Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct state that an attorney is not to represent a client if the representa-
tion would result in a violation of any of the Rules or if the lawyer has been dis-
charged.82 The rules state that an attorney is not to represent a client if there is a
significant risk that the representation of the client will be materially limited by a
personal interest of the lawyer.83 In addition, the Wisconsin Constitution states
that clients are free to choose their own attorneys.84 These additional limitations,
imposed only on attorneys, can complicate issues of reinstatement and employ-
ment law issues generally.
In Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,85 Roger Balla, former in-house counsel for Gambro,
Inc., brought a retaliatory discharge action against the company. 86 Balla, who also
acted as manager of regulatory affairs for Gambro, learned that a shipment of
kidney dialysis machines did not fit FDA requirements and told the president of
Gambro to reject the shipment.87 When he did not, Balla told the president that he
would do "whatever [was] necessary to stop the sale of the dialyzers."88 Balla was
discharged from his position shortly thereafter and brought a retaliatory discharge
suit.
The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Gambro, and Balla
appealed.90 The appeals court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the
81. Each state has its own set of rules, but most are based on the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct and contain rules addressing attorney discharge.
82. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.16 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010) ("[A] lawyer shall not represent
a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or ...
(3) the lawyer is discharged."). In addition, the ABA comment section that coincides with that part of
the analogous model rule makes clear the fact that "a client has the right to discharge a lawyer at any
time, with or without cause, but subject to payment for the lawyer's services." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 4 (2009).
83. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.7 ("[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if .. . (2) there is a significant
risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsi-
bilities to another client, a former client, or a third party or by a personal interest of the lawyer.") In
addition, the ABA comment section that coincides with the analogous model rule states,
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk
that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the
client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests....
The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does,
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in con-
sidering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of
the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2009).
84. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 21, cl. 2. (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010) ("In any court of this state,
any suitor may prosecute or defend his suit either in his own proper person or by an attorney of the
suitor's choice.")
85. 584 N.E.2d 104 (lil. 1991).
86. Id. at 105.
87. Id. at 106.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 107.
7
Nouraie: Nouraie: Arbitration Nation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
case for further proceedings. 91 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the
court found that Balla did not have a cause of action against Gambro for retalia-
92tory discharge. The court observed that the requirements to bring a retaliatory
discharge claim were that that the "employer discharge[d] the employee in retalia-
tion for the employee's activities, and that the discharge [was] in contravention of
a clearly mandated public policy." 93 The court determined that Balla fulfilled both
of these requirements. 94
However, the court stated, "[I]n this case, appellee was not just an employee
of Gambro, but also general counsel for Gambro."95 The court cited Herbster v.
North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance,96 a case that recognized the
"unique position attorneys occupy in our society." 97 The Herbster court listed
factors that make the attorney-client relationship special.98 The Balla court stated,
"We agree with the conclusion reached in Herbster that, generally, in-house coun-
sel do not have a claim under the tort of retaliatory discharge." 99 The court in
Balla went on to explore the effect on the attorney-client relationship of allowing
retaliatory discharge claims for in-house counsel. 1' Again relying on Herbster,
the court noted that attorneys are in a unique position to receive secrets, disclo-
sures, and information from their clients.' 0' The court worried that allowing reta-
liatory discharge claims for in-house attorneys would upset the attorney-client
relationship of trust and potentially break down attorney-client communication.102
Thus, it concluded that retaliatory discharge claims should not be extended to in-
house counsel.103
The Balla court also pointed out that because Balla was discharged by Gam-
bro, his continued representation of Gambro would have resulted in a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.' The court went on to state, "In this case,
appellee, in addition to being an employee at Gambro, is first and foremost an
attorney bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct."105
Not all courts have taken the same approach as the court in Balla. This is
evidenced by the holding in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court.lo In
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Ill. 1981)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 108.
96. 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
97. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108 (quoting Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 348).
98. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346-48. The court's list included the attorney-client privilege regarding
confidential communications, the fiduciary duty an attorney owes to a client, the right of the client to
terminate the relationship with or without cause, and the fact that a client has exclusive control over the
subject matter of the litigation and may dismiss or settle a cause of action regardless of the attorney's
advice. Id.
99. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108.
100. Id. at 108-09.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 109-10.
103. Id. at 110.
104. Id.; see ILL. Sup. Cr. R. OF PROF'L CONDUcr 1.16(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 1/15/2010)
(stating an attorney is required to withdraw from representation if continued representation would
result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct).
105. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 11l (emphasis added).
106. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
[Vol. 2010212
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General Dynamics, Andrew Rose, in-house counsel for General Dynamics, was
terminated from his position. 07 According to Rose, he was discharged because he
spearheaded an investigation into employee drug use at one of the company's
plants, protested the bugging of the office of the chief of security, and advised
General Dynamics that its salary policy may be in violation of the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act. 08 Rose alleged that the reasons for his firing were in viola-
tion of public policy and brought a wrongful termination suit.1" General Dynam-
ics filed a general demurrer stating that, because Rose was employed as an in-
house attorney, he was subject to discharge at any time, "for any reason or for no
reason" at all."10 The trial court overruled the demurrer and the court of appeals
denied General Dynamics's petition for a writ of mandate.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of California acknowledged a proliferation
of in-house attorneys in the last two decades.1 2 In addition, the court noted that,
unlike their law firm counterparts, in-house attorneys' economic fates are tied
directly to a single employer.113 The court stated, "[D]ependence of in-house
counsel is indistinguishable from that of other corporate managers or senior ex-
ecutives who also owe their livelihoods . . . to a single organizational employ-
er."ll 4 However, the court noted, unlike other employees, in-house attorneys "la-
bor under unique ethical imperatives that exceed those of the corporate executive .
,,l15
This being said, the court recognized that the unilateral right of a client to dis-
charge its attorney is a central tenet of the lawyer-client relationship, but it is not
unqualified.116 The court pointed out that federal civil rights laws, for example,
apply to law firm partnership decisions.' 17 The court relied on Golightly-Howell
v. Oil Workers," 8 which stated, "[B]ecause Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on race or sex, it prohibits such discrimination against one employed as in-
house counsel."ll 9 The General Dynamics court concluded that, while the right of
a client to discharge his attorney at any time is an important value that should
usually be upheld, sometimes competing interests will overcome that right. 120 The
court determined that such interests existed in Rose's situation and allowed the
wrongful discharge claim.'21 In addition, and especially interesting considering
the court's holding in Sands, the court determined that a client's power to rid itself
of unwanted counsel is not thwarted because "under circumscribed conditions, an
in-house attorney may pursue a wrongful discharge claim for damages against his
107. Id. at 490.
108. Id. at 490-91.






115. Id. at 492 (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at493.
117. Id.
118. 806 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1992).
119. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 493 (quoting Golightly-Howell, 806 F. Supp. at 924).
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corporate employer even though a judgment ordering his reinstatement is not an
available remedy."' 22
Although the Balla and General Dynamics courts ultimately came to different
conclusions regarding whether an in-house attorney should be allowed to bring a
retaliatory discharge claim, both courts acknowledged a difference between in-
house attorneys and non-attorneys in the context of retaliatory discharge.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Sands, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin refused to vacate the arbitration
award ordering reinstatement of plaintiff Dawn Sands to her position as vice pres-
ident and general counsel for Menard.123 The court, applying the highly deferen-
tial standard usually given to arbitration awards, found that the arbitrators had not
manifestly disregarded the law, as claimed by Menard.124
Menard posited three arguments to support its claim that the arbitrators mani-
festly disregarded the law.125 First, Menard contended that the arbitrators mani-
festly disregarded Wisconsin law allowing clients to choose their own attor-
neys.126 In addition, Menard claimed that the reinstatement order violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct, citing both conflict of interest provisions and pro-
visions that determine when an attorney must decline or withdraw from represen-
tation.127 Finally, Menard argued that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the
law by not taking into consideration the hostility which existed between the par-
ties.128 Before addressing Menard's claims, the Court of Appeals examined the
current state of Wisconsin law regarding vacatur of an arbitration award for ma-
nifest disregard of the law.129
Prompted by Sands' claim that manifest disregard of the law was no longer a
basis for vacating an arbitration award, the court examined the state of Wisconsin
law regarding "manifest disregard of the law."'130 The court of appeals expressly
stated that the recent Supreme Court decision in Hall Street Associates, LLC. v.
Mattel, Inc., which limited judicial review under the FAA to the statutory grounds
listed in the statute,131 was not controlling.132 The court of appeals noted that the
Court in Hall Street limited its holding and was speaking "only to the scope of the
expeditious judicial review under [the FAA]." Further, the appeals court recog-
nized that the Hall Street decision indicated that the FAA was not the only way
into court for parties seeking review of arbitration awards and that state statutory
122. Id. at 495 (emphasis in original).
123. Sands v. Menard, Inc., 767 N.W.2d 332, 333 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
124. Id. at 335.
125. Id. at 334-35.
126. Id. at 334.




131. 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008).
132. Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 335 ("We are satisfied that manifest disregard of the law remains a basis
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law or common law may offer judicial review of a different scope.13" Thus, the
court of appeals concluded that manifest disregard of the law was still a basis for
vacating arbitration awards under Wisconsin law.135
Having determined that manifest disregard of the law was still a possible ba-
sis for vacating an arbitration award in Wisconsin, the court moved on to Me-
nard's claim.136 The court concluded that Menard had not demonstrated that the
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. 137 The court noted that it was undis-
puted that reinstatement is a remedy under the EPA and Title VII and that neither
provides an exception for in-house attorneys.138 In addition, the court pointed out
that Menard had no governing case law to support its contention that reinstatement
was not available as a remedy for in-house attorneys who were wrongfully termi-
nated under either the EPA or Title VII.'39 The court concluded that both acts
provided "substantial authority" for the arbitrators' award.14 0
The court indicated that it was unwilling to create new law stating that reins-
tatement was not a remedy for in-house attorneys wrongly discharged under the
EPA or Title VII "when the employer contest[ed] reinstatement or when the attor-
ney might be violating the rules of professional conduct."' 4 ' Additionally, the
court noted that it could not conclude that the arbitrators had manifestly disre-
garded law that did not exist at the time the award was determined. 142
The court also stated that Menard failed to show reason why Wisconsin law
or the Rules of Professional Conduct should trump federal law that provides re-
medies for wrongfully terminated employees.' 43 In addition, the court pointed out
that rules of professional conduct apply to attorneys, not to employers of attor-
neys.'" It stated, "[W]hile the rules may limit the utility of a reinstatement award
for an attorney who may have to decline or withdraw from representation, they do
not prohibit an employer from reinstating an attorney."1 4 5
The court of appeals then pointed out that whether to award front pay or
reinstatement is a discretionary matter to be left up to the arbitrators.146 Accord-
ing to the court, Menard's argument boiled down to an assertion that the arbitra-
tors "erroneously exercised their discretion" in failing to consider that Menard
may not want to reinstate Sands, that Sands may be violating the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, and that the arbitrators failed to give adequate weight to the hos-








141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 335-36.
143. Id. at 336.
144. Id. at 336 n.4.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 336.
147. Id.
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was not a ground for review.14 8 In addition, the court pointed out that it was clear
from the arbitrators' reasoning they considered the hostility between the parties.149
Lastly, the court addressed Menard's claim that failing to consider the law
can amount to manifest disregard of the law.15 0 The court stated that, while not
considering the law may constitute manifest disregard of the law in some cases, s5
for purposes of a discretionary determination, failing to consider the law is not a
manifest disregard of the law.152 The court concluded that the arbitrators had not
manifestly disregarded the law and that adequate authority supported awarding
reinstatement.' 5 3 The court affirmed the award reinstating Sands to her position as
in-house counsel.154
V. COMMENT
In Sands v. Menard,'5 5 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin failed to address a
number of important issues and, as a result, upheld a clearly impractical arbitra-
tion award. First, in deferring to the arbitration panel's decision, the court en-
dorsed an entirely unworkable award. Secondly, the court failed to recognize or
consider persuasive authority suggesting that reinstatement is never an accepted
remedy for wrongfully terminated in-house attorneys. The decision in McNeil v.
General Dynamics, Inc. v. Superior Courtl56 advocated for the conclusion that in-
house attorneys, due to the special role they occupy, should be precluded from
reinstatement in wrongful or retaliatory discharge suits.'5 7 Lastly, the court failed
to adequately address Menard's contention that the Rules of Professional Conduct
and Wisconsin law allowing clients to choose their own attorneys precluded the
reinstatement award. The court failed to analyze the practical effect and implica-
tions of treating Sands, an in-house attorney, the same as a non-attorney for pur-
poses of reinstatement. As a result of these oversights, the court upheld an award
that was practically unworkable and altogether unfair to both parties.
As will be stated in further detail below, it is crucial that courts have the
means to vacate arbitral awards that are clearly erroneous. Parties should not give
up their right to a workable award simply because the arbitrators misunderstood
the law. Not only is it vital that courts have the authority to overturn awards that
they believe are at odds with the law, but it is also necessary that courts use the
authority they have. A national policy of restricting judicial review may lead
courts to mechanically affirm awards when they would otherwise engage in a
more careful analysis. This "rubber stamping" erodes public confidence in the
judiciary and negates the fundamental role that courts play in interpreting and
clarifying the law.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 336 n.5.
150. Id. at 336.
151. See, e.g, Racine County v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists, 751 N.W.2d 312 (Wis. 2008).
152. Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 336.
153. Id. at 335.
154. Id. at 336.
155. 767 N.W.2d 332 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
156. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
157. Id. at 494-95.
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It is widely understood that arbitration awards are subject to only narrow
judicial review and that great deference is paid an arbitrator's decision.' There
are a number of reasons for this. Arbitration is meant to provide parties with a
quick and efficient means of resolving disputes and benefits parties in that it is
generally faster and less expensive than litigation.15 9 If arbitration awards were
subject to broad judicial review, the benefit to the parties would effectively be
vitiated in many situations.160
In addition, by subjecting arbitral decisions to only limited judicial review,
the caseload for both state and federal courts is lightened.' 6' A court seeking to
decrease the number of cases on its docket can do so by reducing the situations in
which review and vacatur of arbitration awards is allowed. If the impetus behind
federal courts' support of arbitration is to lighten the federal docket, as has been
suggested,162 it is easy to see why the Supreme Court, as in Hall Street, narrowed
rather than expanded judicial review of arbitration awards, and it is likely that
state courts will follow suit.
Although retaining the benefits offered to parties through arbitration is para-
mount to assuring that arbitration continues as a viable alternative dispute resolu-
tion tool, it is also important that courts have the power to vacate clearly unwork-
able awards. If parties cannot be assured that clearly unreasonable awards will be
reviewable, arbitration may lose its appeal. It is arguable that expanding, rather
than narrowing the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, is the direction
courts should be moving in. Stephen K. Huber, a noted scholar in the field of
arbitration, states:
In view of the dramatically expanded role of arbitration in the American
legal system during the last quarter century, and the numerous concerns
about these developments, expanding state court review of arbitration
awards offers a promising route for those who believe that arbitration
needs to be checked-both in the sense of limiting arbitration and in
quality control of arbitral awards. 63
Huber suggests that state law standards will be increasingly important in the
reformation of arbitration practice and that states possess the power to adopt stan-
dards for review of arbitration awards that are significantly different from federal
standards.1 He says, "Perhaps, America should move toward a more thorough
and thoughtful review of arbitration awards . . . ."165
158. Smith, supra note 4, at 177 (2004).
159. Id.
160. Thomas S. Meriwether, Limiting Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act: Striking the Right Balance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 739, 740 (2007).
161. Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the Demise of Judi-
cial Review, 2009 J. DiSP. RESOL. 1, 4.
162. See Feliu, supra note 2, at 233.
163. Huber, supra note 38, at 512-13.
164. Id. at 512.
165. Id. at 520.
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Following Hall Street, state courts are coming to different conclusions as to
whether parties may contract for expanded judicial review. 166 In addition, dicta in
Hall Street167 has led courts to question the viability of common law bases for
vacating arbitration awards, such as "manifest disregard of the law."l68 Manifest
disregard has, in some form or another, been widely adopted by both federal and
state courts and has been considered an important means for vacating arbitration
awards that are "egregiously wrong."' 69 Policing arbitration decisions that are at
odds with what a court would likely find is an accepted function for courts review-
ing arbitral awards and trial court decisions.' 70 If the Hall Street decision ulti-
mately leads state courts to discard common law grounds for vacatur and, as fed-
eral courts have, refuse to uphold clauses expanding judicial review of arbitration
awards, the supervisory function courts serve may be seriously compromised.
In addition to having authority to vacate flawed arbitral awards, it is crucial
that courts use this authority when faced with an award that should not stand.
Although the court in Sands ultimately determined that common law grounds such
as "manifest disregard of the law" and "violation of strong public policy" were
still valid options for vacating an arbitration award in Wisconsin, the court did not
effectively employ them. 171 Refusing to vacate the award for manifest disregard
of the law, the court essentially determined that it was without authority to upset
the arbitration award. 172
However, the court also stated that failing to consider the law could constitute
manifest disregard of the law. It is arguable that the arbitration panel's decision
was in manifest disregard of the law. The issue of reinstatement in Sands was
unique and somewhat nuanced due to the fact that Sands was an in-house attorney.
The effect that the professional rules have on attorney conduct and the role of in-
house attorneys was likely better understood and accounted for by the court of
appeals than by the arbitration panel. For this reason, the court could have rea-
sonably concluded that the combination of Sands' role as in-house counsel and the
limitations imposed on her by the professional rules of conduct rendered the reins-
tatement order in manifest disregard of the law.
Furthermore, while Menard did not offer a public policy argument, it would
have been no great leap for the court to have determined that reinstating Sands
violated public policy. 174 The court did not seriously consider the possibility of
166. James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 745, 773 (2009).
167. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) ("'[M]anifest disregard' can be
read as merely referring to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.").
168. Huber, supra note 38, at 558.
169. Id. at 558, 562.
170. Id. at 562.
171. Sands v. Menard, Inc., 767 N.W.2d 332, 334-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
172. Id. The court stated that, "Courts have limited power to vacate arbitration awards." Id. at 333.
Proceeding to the manifest disregard claim, the court stated that it could not "create law stating that
reinstatement is not a remedy for in-house attorneys" and that it could not "conclude the arbitrators
manifestly disregarded law that was nonexistent at the time of the arbitrators' decision." Id. at 335-336.
173. Id. at 336 (citing Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 751 N.W.2d 312,
324 (Wis. 2008)).
174. Although Menard did not offer a solid public policy argument, the court stated, "While Menard
makes scattered references to the arbitrators' award being contrary to public policy, Menard does not
develop a distinct argument in that regard." Id. at 335 n.2. (citing authority for the proposition that
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overturning the award on grounds of public policy, but it should have. "[P]ublic
policy" provides "an independent basis for vacating an arbitration award that does
not fit within . . . other established categories." 7  Public policy, at least in the
federal context, is most often used in the context of vacating orders reinstating
terminated employees in labor-management cases.176 The court in Sands could
have recognized the importance of upholding the legitimacy of the attorney-client
relationship, both in actuality and perception, and vacated the reinstatement order
on public policy grounds. In large part, the ethical rules of conduct that attorneys
abide by are built on the idea of maintaining the legitimacy and strength of the
attorney-client relationship.' 77 In addition, to protect the legitimacy of the judicial
process, it is important that courts do not endorse worthless, illusory awards.
Professor Christopher R. Drahozal suggests that the real issue in such situations is
the integrity of the judicial process. He notes that it is important to find a way
to enable "courts to avoid putting their power and authority behind arbitral awards
that openly flaunt the law." 79
In Sands the court even alluded to the fact that contravention of public policy
may have provided grounds for vacatur of the award, had Menard attempted such
an argument.o80 The result reached in Sands, that an organization be forced to
reinstate terminated in-house counsel, is likely shocking to anyone who under-
stands the attorney-client relationship. If, rather than deferring to the arbitration
panel's decision, the court had effectively used its powers of judicial review, an
impracticable decision could have been avoided.
B. In-house Attorneys and Reinstatement
The court in Sands cites to Hybert v. Hearst Corp.'8 ' for the proposition that
an award of front pay or reinstatement is discretionary, left up to the court.1 it is
important to note that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly stated in
Hybert that there were situations where reinstatement was inappropriate.' 83 In
these situations, such as when the employer-employee relationship is "pervaded
by hostility," the Hybert court suggested that front pay is the appropriate reme-
dy.184 The court in Sands seems to have ignored this part of the Hybert opinion,
which is clearly contrary to the ultimate holding in Sands.
Additional authority, specifically dealing with discharged in-house attorneys,
suggests that reinstatement for in-house attorneys is never an appropriate remedy.
courts need not address undeveloped arguments). This suggests that a persuasive public policy argu-
ment may have affected the court's decision.
175. Huber, supra note 38, at 569.
176. Id.
177. The entire first section of the "model rules" is dedicated to the client lawyer relationship. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0-.18 (2009).
178. Huber, supra note 38, at 561; Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV.
L.J. 234, 250 (2007).
179. Drahozal, supra note 178, at 250.
180. Sands v. Menard Inc., 767 N.W.2d 332, 335 n.2 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2009); see supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
181. 900 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1990).
182. Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 336 (citing Hybert, 900 F.2d at 1054-55).
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In General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court,85 the Supreme Court of California
determined that an in-house attorney could bring a retaliatory discharge claim in
certain situations.' 86 However, the court stated that allowing a retaliatory dis-
charge claim does not thwart a client's ability to rid itself of unwanted counsel
because "under circumscribed conditions, an in-house attorney may pursue a
wrongful discharge claim for damages against his corporate employer, even
though a judgment ordering his reinstatement is not an available remedy."' 87
Sands' standing to bring a retaliatory discharge claim is not at issue here, and
the Sands court never suggests that it is. However, as evidenced by the holdings
in Hybert and General Dynamics, there is a question as to whether reinstatement
is ever an option for discharged in-house attorneys. This is especially so where
the relationship between the discharged attorney and her former employer is "per-
vaded with hostility," as was the case in Sands.
C. Ethical Considerations: In-house Attorneys
and the Special Role They Serve
An interesting consideration, and one not addressed by the Sands court, is the
practical effect of treating in-house attorney-employees and non-attorney em-
ployees similarly in reinstatement situations. Attorneys, governed by the Rules of
Professional Conduct, have different ethical obligations to their employers than
non-attorney employees. The court declined to address the fact that an attorney in
Sands' situation, bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct, has little choice but
to decline reinstatement.
Grace Geisel's article, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma of In-House
Counsel, illustrates the unique issues that in-house counsel face."s Although
Geisel's article generally contemplates ethical issues faced by in-house attorneys
while still employed, the distinction she makes between in-house counsel and
other attorneys works in Sands' case nonetheless. Like other attorneys, in-house
counsel are bound to "withdraw from representation if 'the representation will
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law."'" Unlike
most attorneys, in-house counsel depend solely on one client, their employer, for
income. 19 Loss of that one client "reduces profitability to zero."l91
In Sands' case, losing her job reduced profitability to zero. In addition, ethi-
cal obligations more than likely require her to decline the remedy she was offered:
reinstatement. As a result, the reinstatement award, meant to benefit her, is ren-
dered meaningless. Moreover, in taking the place of front pay, the unenforceable
reinstatement award robbed her of a workable remedy. Had Sands decided to
accept the reinstatement, she risked sanctions and forced withdrawal from her
185. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
186. Id. at 501.
187. Id. at 495 (emphasis in original).
188. Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma of In-House Counsel, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 535 (1992).
189. Id. at 545 (quoting MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1. 16(a)(1) (1983).
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position, based on violation of the ethical rules. Neither option would have been
especially appealing for Sands.
While it may be true, as the Sands court states, that the Rules do not explicitly
prohibit reinstatement of an attorney in Sands' situation, equity would suggest that
prohibition should be implied.192 The special relationship that exists between in-
house counsel and his or her employer requires that in-house counsel be treated
differently than non-attorney employees in certain situations. In addition, forcing
a company to retain counsel against its will is a blatant violation of a principle
considered essential in the legal profession.
Decisions from the highest courts in both Illinois and California support the
contention that in-house attorneys should be treated differently for purposes of
discharge and reinstatement. The courts in Balla and General Dynamics came to
different conclusions regarding whether or not a discharged attorney should be
allowed to bring a retaliatory discharge claim. However, both courts recognized
the fact that in-house attorneys occupy a unique role in our society and that issues
regarding their discharge require a unique analysis. This is especially true when
issues of reinstatement arise. It is clear that neither court would have endorsed a
decision to reinstate a discharged in-house attorney.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Sands ultimately resulted in an unworkable arbitral award that
either deprived an injured party of a portion of her remedy or deprived a client of
its fundamental right to discharge its attorney, forcing the attorney back to work in
violation of the rules of professional conduct. Either way, the award is inequita-
ble. The Sands holding demonstrates the need for courts to conduct careful re-
view of arbitration awards and effectively employ their powers of judicial review.
Courts are the mechanism by which awards that are clearly incorrect and unwork-
able may be vacated.
While there is not much room for expansion of judicial review under federal
law, there is a "vast potential scope" for expanding the regulation of arbitrators
and arbitration awards under state law.193 As a result, "[s]tate law standards will
be of increasing importance in the reformation of arbitration" in the United
States.194 Hopefully the Sands decision will reaffirm the fact that judicial review
of arbitral awards, while necessarily narrow, is also indispensible. As the reach of
arbitration in the United States expands, it is vital that the role judicial review
plays in arbitration is better understood, defined, and implemented.
F. SHABNAM NOURALE
192. Sands v. Menard, Inc., 767 N.W.2d 332, 336 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
193. See Huber, supra note 38, at 513.
194. Id. at 512.
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